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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF' THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH GAS SERVICE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff
-vs.-

PUBLIC SFJRVICE COIIIl\lISSION
OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING,
fLtL S. BENNETT, andD. FRANK
\YTL KINS, Commissioners of the
Puhlie Service Commission of Utah,
and l\IOUN'l1 AIN :F'Ul~L SUPPLY
CO ~IP ANY, a corpora ti on,
Defendants.

)

\

Case
No. 10264

BRIEF OF DEFENDENTS
8'11 .ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
'11 his action involns an application of Mountain Fuel

for a eNtificate of convenience and necessity authorizing
'.rountain Fuel to extend its natural gas distribution
~r"tC'm for the service of natural gas to the inhabitants
of the commu11ity of Bonanza, and other areas in "Uintah
County in the vicinity of said facilities. Utah Gas filed a
protest and petition of intervention requesting that
Mountain Fuel's application be denied and for affirmatiYe relief in the form of a Commission order directing
Mouutain Fuel to deliver to Utah Gas from its pipeline

1

system at its location near the unincorporated cornm11 _
nity of Bonanza, sufficient gas at a reasonabl0 r;1te to
supply the inhabitants of the community of Bonanza and
other areas in Uintah County in the vicinity of its facilities as gas service is needed there.
DISPOSITION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Commission issued its report and order granting
to Mountain Fuel a certificate of convenience and necessity and denying the request of Utah Gas for an order
directing Mountain Fuel to deliver to Utah Gas from its
pipeline system, sufficient gas at reasonable rates to supply inhabitants of the community of Bonanza, Utah, and
other areas in Uintah County in the Yicinity of the facilities as gas service is needed.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendants seek a dismissal of the Writ of Review
herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company <lisagrees sharply with Plaintiff's statement of the facts in
the following particulars:
(1) On page 6 of its brief, Plaintiff states that:

"Utah Gas has never been approached by the
Commission or anyone from Bonanza or the American Gilsonitc Company concerning the supplyi1 1gof gas service to Bonanza, Utah.''
2

This falls way short of presenting the full pirture.
·what Plaintiff fails to point out is that Plaintiff at no
time approached American Gilsonite Company or anyone else at Bonanza to see if gas service was desired
(R. 175). Plaintiff did not make a survey of requiremenh; there, nor did it know of the industrial market
which American Gilsonite operations offered (R. 184).
This seems even more incredible when contrasted with
Laughlin 's testimony that Plaintiff relics heavily on industrial business (R. 173).
(2) On page 7 of its brief, Plaintiff states:
"It was not until De<'ember 7, 1965, the date of
notice of the applica.tion of Mountain Fuel, that
Utah Gas learned of the need for service to Bonanza, Utah (R. 111). It was only within four to
five days prior to the he-aring that Utah Gas
learned that Cascade was under the full jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission."
This statement seriously distorts the picture of
Plaintiff's awareness of what was happening. In crossexamination, Plaintiff's president, Mr. Laughlin, (however reluctantly) admitted that he at least was aware of
the Cascade project (R. 176). As we point out in the
argument below, there were many other items contributing to Laughlin's awareness of what was happening.
As far as the 'need for service' is concerned, it is hard
to :sre how anyone in the gas business could even wonder
about the 'need' in any community lacking gas service.
(See the comparison of the cost of available fuels (R. 27),
a11d the testimony of Thfr. Borden (R. 135)).
(3) On pages 7 and 8, Plaintiff offers its alibi for
not seni11g Bonanza from other gas sources in the area.
3

It states that Pacific Natural Gas Exploration Compa 11 y:
" ... did not want to tie up their gas supply to
small retail operations.''
and that with reference to vValco Corporation arnl tlic
Red Wash producers:
" .... his company's requirements wrre so small
that it was difficult to induce sairl partirs to consider selling gas on a long term ha sis.''
Plain.tiff did not actually ask any of them for a gas suppry for Bonanza! (See testimony of J\Tr. Laug;hlin, R.
179, 181.) Nothing in the record indicates that gas could
not have heen obtained from any of the suggested sourct·~.
Furthermore Mr. Laughlin stated that the CascadL·J\fountain Fuel Supply source offered an eeonomicall.r
feasible g·as supply for serving Bonanza (R. J 72). lfo
then admitted that Plaintiff never contacted either company regarding a supply to enable it to sern B01rn11zn
(R. 175, 176).
( 4) On page 8 of its brief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant ]\fountain Fuel Supply Company wonld lrnYr to
use employees from Emery County, Utah, to serYicc
Bonanza. This ignores the testimony of "Witness AUPn
(R. 160, 161) to the effect that these requirements l'.-onld
be met from ''our personnel in this area.''
(5) Plaintiff claims (at page 9 of its brief) tl1at for
Mountain Fuel Supply Company to serve Bonanza '.\ 011lL1
jeopardize Plaintiff's ability to finance its operation~.
Yet, the record shows (R. 187) that Plailltiff refinanced on three different occnsions, even thongh it "'- :1''
not then serving Bonanza. Thus service to Bonanza J,r
4

Jlefondm1t l\fount<.lin Fuel Supply Company could liave
llO effect on Plaintiff's horrmYing- capacity.
Sneh loans
arr made on the hasis of Plaintiff's existing system
(R. 1D2-195).

-vve

submit that the following statement correctly
represents the facts :
( 1) Ever since 1952, the people in Bonanza have
been seeking gas service, according to the testimony of
Mr. Paul Borden, American Gilsonite manager at Bo1rnl10',a (R. 137).
(2) On J\far<'h 13, 1956, Defendant Utah Pnhlic Service Commission granted a Certificate of Pul1lic Con :enir11ce ancl Neeessity to Plaintiff Utah Gas to sen'e natural
gas in the cities of Monticello, Moab ancl Vernal, Utah.
Jts order also provided:
1

"It is further ordered, That Utah Gas Service
Company, a corporation, without obtaining additional authority threfor, may build additional distrilmtion facilities in the counties of San .Juan,
Grand, and Uintah where there is a demand for
natural gas service and which may be economically served.''
(3) At no time since March 13, 1956, did Plaintiff
ever:
(a) Contact any gas supplier in the area to find
out whether it could acquire gas to provide economically sound service to Bonanza, nor
(h) make any efforts to find out whether the
people at Bonanza ·were interested in natural gas
service.
5

( 4) Prior to July 23, 1963, efforts were comme11cl~<l
to bring western Colorado gas to Utah. On July 2:3, 196:3,
Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company entered into
a contract with Garfield Gas Gathering Company to buikl
facilities to bring western Colorado gas to Utah for sale
to Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company. (See
R. 75. This letter was introduced into the record as a portion of Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing.)
( 5) On March 31, 1964, Garfield Gas Ga theri11g Company filed with the Federal Power Commission an application to serve Defendant Mountain Fuel Supply Company with gas (R. 53, 76).
(6) On July 31, 1964, the Federal Pffw0r Comrni:'sion issued a Certificate of Convenience arnl N cccssity
to Garfield Gas Gathering Company (R. 53, 54). It should
be born in mind that the Federal Power Commission hac;
declared that Defendant Mountain Fuel's facilities wh;eh
receive gas from Cascade are exempt from that agency's
jurisdiction. (See R. 88, which entered the record 1ia
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing.)

(7) Prior to August 23, 1965, Garfield commenced
the construction of the facilities authorized by the Certificate ( R. 85). These were completed in September or
October, 1965, according to Witness Laughlin (R. 184).
(8) On September 16, 1965, Cascade Natural Gns
Corporation moved the Federal Power Commission tu
amend the above certificate by substituting C<lscade a::
applicant successor in interest to Garfield (R. 81-8/).
(9) On October 21, 1965, the Fec1en1J Po,yer (~orn
mission issued the order substituting Cascade for Gar
6

tielc1 (R. 55, 56).

( 10) ~When the American Gilsonite people first saw
the engineers checking rights of way for the construction
of the line by Bonanza, they approached Defendant
Mountain Fuel Supply Company and requested gas ·
serYice (R. 140).
( 11) On September 22, 1965, an cl November 17, 1965,
American Gilsonite wrote Defendant Utah Public Service Commission alluding to the Mountain Fuel Supply
Company line and asking for natural gas service. (Plaintiff seems to object that these letters are in the record
without having been introduced in evidence. However,
their subject matter was brought out in full detail by
Witness Paul Borden, and he was thoroughly cross-examined by Plaintiff's Counsel at the hearing.)
(12) On October 19, 1965, Defendant Mountain Fuel
Supply Company filed its application for a certificate to
serve Bonanza (R. 1).
(13) On December 7, 1965, notice was mailed to L. L.
Langhlin, President, Utah Gas Service Company (Plaintiff herein) and to Plaintiff's Counsel, Edward F. Richards, indicating that hearing would be had on the Mountain Fuel application on January 25, 1966 (R. 11, 12, 13).
(14) Not until January 18, 1966 (seven days before
the hearing) did Plaintiff file its Protest and Petition of
Intervention herein (R. 16). Furthermore, this petition
not only asked that Mountain Fuel's application be denir,d, but went much further, and asked that the Commis~iou act affirmatively and order Defendant Mountain Fuel
7

to sell sufficient gas to Plaintiff to supply Bomn1za
(R. 17-18).
(15) On January 25, 1966, the hearing was conducted, and Plaintiff participated fully therein and rn·oduced testimony in support of its request for a gas supply
from Mountain Fuel, despite the protest of .!\fountain
Fuel that the Commission could not properly cousidrr
the affirmative relief requested by Plaintiff in the proceeding (R. 20).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WAS NOT PROP"BJRLY BK
FORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMl\fISSlON.
As part of what it referred to as its protest, Plaintiff asked Defendant Public Service Commission to compel Defendant Mountain Fuel to serve Plaintiff gas for
resale in Bonanza.
Such affirmative relief must be sought by an Applicant (Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Public S('nice Commission of Utah, Rule 6.3) or a Petitioner (Rnlc
6.5) under circumstances where this Commission may
give adequate notice to all parties concerned pursuant
to its usual procedure (Rule 14.1).
To properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Defendant Commission to issue the order in question, Plaintiff i"
required by law to :file an original petition seeking snch
affirmative relief, demonstra.ting economic feasi1Jility,
and showing that the public convenience and necessity
requires the relief sought.
8

Rather than this, Plaintiff attempted on seven days'
notice to convert the hearing on Defendant Mountain
Ii'uel 's application into its own affirmative proceeding.
We submit that this was improper.
POINT II.
PI,AINTIFF HAD NO EXCLUSIVE CERTIFICATE FOR UINTAH COUNTY.
After granting a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity to supply natural gas in the cities of Monticello, Moab, and Vernal, Utah, the order of Defendant
Public Service Commission in Case No. 4213 provides :

"Tt is further ordered that Utah Gas Service

Company, a corporation, without obtaining additional authority therefor, may build additional clistrilmtion facilities in the counties of San Juan,
Grand. and Uintah, where there is a demand for
natural gas service and which may be economically served." ( R 59)
Yet in this case the record reveals no approved rates
nor does it include any showing of economic feasibility
for the service Plaintiff seeks to provide. It certainly
does not show that Plaintiff had at that time any source
of mdural gas to supply Bonanza. In fact, the above
order of Defendant Public Service Commission is merely
a repetition of the contiguity provisions of Seetion
54-4-25 UCA, meant to allow a utility, which is serving
a given area, to expand beyond its original limits. The
order, itself, adds nothing to the staturorily granted
power.
In the absence of a clear showing of rates ancl sources
of ,<:11pply (together with the cost thereof), the conditions
9

of the above provision are obviously not met. The Commission was certainly not barred by its prior lm1g-uage
from granting the instant certificate.
Without r8gard to the geographic extent of P1Rintiff's certificate, it is still not exclusive. Plaintiff could
not hold the area open for future possible development
as against the application of a company ready to act. In
State Ex. Rel. Kansas City Power & Light Company v.
Public Service Commission of Missouri, 8 P.U.R. (NS)
192, 76 S.W. 2d. 343 the Court said:
"Neither the Commission nor the courts Rhould
protect a utility company in its attempt to reserYr
a certain area unto itself as its exrlusi\'e territon,
unless the company is willing- and ahle to promptlY
furnish adequate service to consumers in tlrnt territory within a reasonable time and at fair arnl
reasonable rates for the type of service required."
See also: Commercial Motor Freight v. Pitblic Utilities
Comrnission, 87 P.U.R. (N.S.) 348, 154 Ohio St. 388, 95
N.E. 2d 758; Re American Lo11isiana Pipe Line ro.
(F.P.·C.) 6 P.U.R. 3rd 476; Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers v. Pen;n. Pub. Utility Corn., 185 Pa. Superior Ct.
588, 138 A. 2d 693.
POINT III.
(IN ANSWER TO POINT I OF PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF.) FINDING NO. 8 OF THE CO~LMT8SION SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Plaintiff objects to the Commission's finding that
it was not willing and able to promptly furnish adequate
service ·within a reasonable time to the community of
Bonanza.
10

l\Iuch of the Plaintiff's argument is based upon the
assertion that the representatives of American Gilsonite
Company did not seek out Plaintiff and request gas servirc. vVe feel strongly that since Plaintiff was in the gas
business, claimed a right to operate in the territory involved and had the technical knowledge of what steps
could be taken to obtain and market gas, it was incumbent on it to locate the available gas sources and to make
sales overtures to potential customern at Bonanza. Even
Mr. Laughlin admitted at the hearing (R. 175) that he
did not customarily promote gas sales simply by waitiug for customers to hunt him up.
At the same time plaintiff excuses itself from makiug any effort to request gas service from such sources as
Pacific Natural Gas Exploration Company, Walco and
the Red \¥ash Oil Field on the grounds that Pacific "did
not want to tie up their gas supply to small operations,''
and that Plaintiff's requirements were so small that it
was difficult to induce said parties to consider selling gas
on a long term basis. It is clear that none of Plaintiff's
officers or agents actually requested any of the nearby
sources to provide gas for Bonanza during the ten years
Plaintiff has been located in Uintah County (R. 179, 181).
Plaintiff chose to ignore the following significant
series of events :
First came the Garfield Gas Gathering Company
project. Prior to July 23, 1963, efforts were commenced
to bring western Colorado gas to Utah (R. 75). These
negotiations and efforts continued without let-up until
September or October of 1965, ·when they were eulminated
in stH:eessful completion of the project (R. 184).
11

It is net coucefrable that a man of Langhlin's experience, \\'110 was present in Uintah County managing
Plaintiff company, would not have heard of these ne11o,,
tiations and construction projects. As an exeusc for not
asking Cascade to supply Plaintiff with gas for rrl'lale
in Bonanza, Mr. Laughlin claimed that he did not know
until a few days before January 25, 1966, that Casrarlr
was suhject to the jurisdiction of the Ferlera1 Power
Commission. However, on cross-examination, he a<lmiltecl he could have contacted Cascade for gas reg·;rnllesc
of its status before the Federal Power Commission, yet
he made no such contact (R. 177).
vVhen asked if he had knoym ahout the C1J srarlr' pr1'.iect for a long time, Laughlin replird, '' ~; ot nTy mnrh
about it, no" (R. 176). These ;ire trm1sparo11tly c)rnsiyr•
arnrwers, >d1ich were made to conceal a thorough lrnrnl'ledge of events in whieh he and his company wen• 1101
interested at the time, or demonstrates an utter disregard
of the welfare of the people whom Plaintiff seeln: the
exclusive right to supply with gas.
On March 31, 1964, the Garfield Gas Onthering Company applied to the Federal Powrr C1ommission for n
Certificate to serve ~fountain Fuel (R. 53, 54). Latrr,
on September 16, 1965, Cascade filed its npp1ira1ion to
be substituted for Garfield (R. 55, 56). Plaintiff ig-11orn1
the notices of these proceedings which were puhlished
in the Feueral Register.
Even when notice of the l\f ountain Fuel Snnpl>- Company application before Defendant Public f'.:•n i(•1• C'01nmission y;8s received, Plaintiff consted a ~ong f<·l' ~,ix
weeks, mid reacted with its plen(lin'; seekiw.!: iHten·t·J:

J2

11011, prot0st, and affirmative relief, only on January 18,

1%(), ha n• I)' seven dnys before the heari11g.

1'he only
.~i.'-'.·11 of interest in the distribution of gas to Bonanza
w!ii<·h Plaintiff has shown occm-rccl after Mountain Fuel
( 'ompm1y sought authority to bring gas into that area,
a n<l senral years after the Cascade-1\fountain Fuel project was initiated.
1t was certainly proper for the Commission to certify

tlw npplieant, l\[ountain Fnel Snpply Company, simply
lH•c<rnse it movecl expeditiously in response to the request
for se1Tiee hy American Gilsonite, and as Plaintiff admib:; in its lffief, " ... nor is there any dispute as to the
qnulifieations and fownC'ial ability of ?\fountain Fuel to
snpply such service .... ''
..c\J the same time Plaintiff has not met the test preseriht•d in State Ex Rel. Kansas City P. & L. Company
L Pul1!ic SrrvfrP, Commission of Missouri, 8 P.U.R. (NS)
l!l'.2, IG ~LW. 2cl 343, (Supra, page 10). In attacking the
applicability of the Kansas City P. & L. Company case
to the instant situation, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish
it on the grounds that neither American Gilsonite nor
tlie Corrunission requested Plaintiff fo prO"'>'ide gas for
Bonairna. This again reflects Plaintiff's distorted view
of the sales responsihilit)T and promotional efforts which
are properly expected of a utility allowed to serve a
'2,l\'1•11 area.

\V c submit that it would prejudice sernce to 110w
areas to hold, as Plaintiff urges on Page 13 of its brief,
rlrnt tlw Public Service Commission has a dnty to procure
•mch 11ew ser~nce hy prodding adjncent utilities in+o
<H·tion.
J :3

POINT IV.
(IN ANSWER TO POINT II OF PLAINTIFF'S
BRIEF.) THE COJ\iMISSION COULD NOT
LAWFULLY REQUIRE MOUNTAIN FUJ<~L
TO SELL GAS TO PLAINTIFF, UTAH GAS.
The Commission stated in Finding Number 8 that it
did not believe it should compel Mountain Fuel Supply
to make a supply of gas available to Utah Gas to serve
Bonanza. It went on to say: "Even if we were so inclined, we believe we are without authority so to do."
Plaintiff, in attacking this ruling, concentrates on
the last sentence and in effect discusses the statutory
powers and obligations of the Commission in the jurisdictional sense. Obviously, the Commission ·was ref erring
to its power to make a substantive determination on these
particular facts. Undoubtedly on the proper facts, it
would have power to order one utility to wholesale to
another.
The Public Utility Ad of Utah does not contain n
provision granting authority to the Commission to compel one utility to render wholesale service to another
utility when the former has not undertaken tl1is typ~
of public service. Where a utility has only held itself
out to serve retail customers and has by its own rules
always forbidden resale, it cannot be required to furniRh
wholesale service.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed this gencr8l
rule in the case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Com/H111.lf Y.
Corporation Commission et al., 88 Okla. 51, 211 Pac. "iOJ.
31 A.L.R. 330, in which it held,
14

"The authorities are harmonious in holding that
one enters the public business by professing or undertaking to serve the public and that his public
obligation is limited by the extent of his profession. Thus, in Wyman on Public Service Corporations, Vol. I ~ 250, it is said: 'Public profession
not only establishes public obligation, but it largely determines the extent of the public duty. Just
as people cannot be forced to serve unless they
have made public profession, so they cannot be
forced to serve beyond what their profession
covers.'

"* * *
"While the Corporation Commission may within
constitutional and reasonable limitations compel
appellant to extend its service within the boundaries of those cities it is now serving or those it
may undertake to serve, it is without power or
authority to compel appellant to serve a city not
included within its profession of service. To compel appellant to extend its service to a city, to,vn
or community it has not undertaken or professed
to serve, it is tantamount to an appropriation of
private property for public use without just compensation.''
The North Carolina Supreme Court followed the rule
in the case of Salisbury & S. R. Co. v. Southern Power
Com1Jany, 179 N. C. 18, 101 S. E. 593, 12 A.L.R. 304,
wherein Walker .J. stated on rehearing, 179 N. C. 330,
l 02 S.E. 625, as follows :
"I candidly admit that as a general proposition
one public service corporation cannot be made to
s11p7Jly a competitor, another public service corporation of like character, with the material necessary to enable the latter to discharge its duty to
the public ....
15

"In my opinion the clef endant had the right originally to confine its sales arnl contrncts to those
desiring electricity for direct persona 1 consumption, and thcreb.'' retain eontrnl of the irnmhrr of
its customers, limiting tlwm to that numhn it
conld adequately serve . . . .
"If the defendant in the heginning had e1cdcc1 to
supply onl.'r the individual c01rnumcr, T mn snfafied it could not hm'e been eompe1lefl to suppl)·
smaller corporations engaged in retailing ih<~ <"],,e
tric current. ...

The rule is also stated in Pond "Public Fti1itico.''
Vol. 1, P. 59:3, as follows:
"Unless a public utilit.'' holds itself out as offeri11L'
wholesale service, it cmmot he recn1irrd to furni8l1
service to another utility for distribution to irnliviclual customers, becausf' the effect of forci11g· it
to do so would be to make it a party to thr crc'.1tion and support of a competitor in the same line
of service.''
For similar holdings, see 011rr.qy Electric Co. v. T11 liana Utility Co., P.S.C. (1917), P.U.R. (1918B) 209: He
Ohio Fuel Supply Co., P.U.R. (1921A) 628; T01.cr:r Operating Co. v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (19;)0), 87
P.U.R. (N.S.) 381; and II alls Eledric Co. v. Carolina
Light & Power Co. (1929), 197 N. C. 766, 150 S.:E~. 621.
1

In the case of Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public
Service Conimission, 249 P. 2d 951, The Ufah 8nprcrnc
Court sustained an order of the Public Se1Tice Commission, under which the Power Company ~was n'qui 1 cd
to sell elcctricit.'' for resale to the town of Y qJliL r:L'l1is
case is easil~' disti1' guishe<l from the pr·"~;011 t cn se, IH'crt 1Fl'
the power company had a rate schednlc prnYicli11g· i'i'
16

sales " ... at wholesale to municipalities, governmental
ag-encics or public servire companies the high voltage
rlcctric energy for resale to inhabitants of cities, towns
or villages.'' There was no question of the power company's ability to perform this service, nor that it had
professed to do so; therefore, the court concluded that
the Commission acted within its power in ordering the
power rompany to serve the type of customer within its
territory which it has professed to serve, i.e., to sell electric euergy at wholesale to a municipality for resale to
its inhabitants.
The Court used this language :
'' ... the Commission acted within its power in ordering that company to serve the type of customer
within its territory which it has professed to serve,
i.e., to sell electric energy at wholesale to a municipality for resale to its inhabitants." (italics ours)
The Federal laws and the discussion of factors related to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission cited by Plaintiff on pages 14, 15, 16 and 17 of its
brief do not apply to this case. The question here concerns local distribution to Bonanza, Utah, a matter exempted from the natural gas act (U. S. Code, Title 15,
Sec. 717 ( b), which provides that the act ". . . shall
not apply to ... the local distribution of natural gas or
to the facilities used for such distribution . . . . ") The
Utah Public Service Commission has full jurisdiction
here to deal with the question before it.
That this is recognized by the Federal Power CommisRion is apparent from the letter of July 15, 1966, which
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it forwarded to the Supreme Court of Utah. Plaintiff
'
when denied Mountain Fuel gas by the Utah Public Service Commission, petitioned the F. P. C. to order Cascade
to supply it with gas for Bonanza. Until the Utah Supreme Court acts on the pending Writ of Review, the
F.P.C. refuses to act on Plaintiff's petition.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we stress the fact that the need of
the Bonanza people went unmet for many years during
which Plaintiff claimed authority to operate in the Yicinity. Now Mountain Fuel Supply Company has dontl
something about it, and should not be prevented from
carrying its worthwhile effort to completion because
Plaintiff belatedly concerned itself with serYice to Bonanza. The writ of review should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
B. Z. KASTLER, JR.
JOHN CRA \VFORD, JR., and
GLEN M. HATCH

Attorneys for Defendant

111 ountain Fuel Sitpply Co.

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney Ge11eral

Attorney for Defe11da11ts,
Public 8er1'ice Commission of

Utah, Donald Hacking, II al 8.

Bennett and D. Frank TVilki11s.
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